T raditionally, the costs of unemployment have been thought of in terms of the output or national income directly foregone. The most notable of these approaches is Okun's Law, which states that a one-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate translates roughly into a threepercent shortfall in output. Approaches such as this are incomplete for normative analysis because they do not provide a measure of the utility losses attributed to cyclical unemployment. Our pro p o s e d method for measuring these losses is based on the notion that the unemployment rate is a measure of general labor market risk. Because fluctuations in the unemployment rate reflect changes in risk, the cost of cyclical unemployment can be measured by the amount that people are willing to pay to avoid it. Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) view genera l labor market conditions, as re p resented by the u n e m p l oyment ra t e, as a re g i o n -s p e c i fic amenity that is ta ken into consideration when agents make migration decisions. The sta n d a rd of living is the utility l evel that the ave rage agent attains from the income and amenities of a region. If migration is frictionless: Utility-maximizing agents are optimally located at every point in time, the sta n d a rd of living is unifo r m a c ross re g i o n s, and interregional income differe n t i a l s indicate the compensating differentials paid fo r d i f f e rences in unemployment and other amenities (the "voting with your feet" criterion of Tiebout, 1956 ). There fo re, the compensating differential for a re g i o n 's unemployment rate can be obtained by cont rolling for the differences in the other amenities. Fo l l owing Tiebout, a large body of work has been p roduced in the regional economics and re g i o n a l s c ience litera t u re dealing with compensating differe nt i a l s, wa g e s, and migration (see Po rell, 1982 , for a partial survey). At the same time, fo l l owing Harris and To d a ro (1970) and Hall (1970) , macro-labor e c o nomists have produced many papers examining the relationships between migration, wa g e s, and unemploym e n t rates (see Ghatak, Lev i n e, and Wheatley Price, 1996, for a survey). The most recent significant addition to this latter litera t u re is Blanchflower and O s wald (1994) , who have called into question a basic result of Harris-To d a ro type models, which is that high unemployment rates are compensated for with higher wa g e s.
The most glaring difference between the two a p p roaches is that the macro-labor litera t u re genera l l y i g n o res the fact that potential migrants consider things other than wages and unemployment. Because of this, the litera t u re searches for a link between those two variables as a means of proving or disproving that compensating differentials exist. It is re c o g n i zed in the regional litera t u re, howeve r, that such a link, although interesting, proves little because wages and u n e m p l oyment rates both can be compensated fo r with high levels of amenities. More importa n t l y, give n the ongoing debate among regional economists about the appropriateness of the assumption of sta n d a rdof-living equiva l e n c e, which is common to both l i t e ra t u re s, the empirical results of both should be v i ewed with some tre p i d a t i o n .
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Our approach fo l l ows Rosen (1979) and Ro b a c k (1982) in considering the unemployment rate as a re g i o n -s p e c i fic amenity. It is a departure from their models in that we recognize the possibility that, in the short run, frictions may prevent the optimal allocation of agents across regions. Because of these frictions, differences in unemployment rates and other amenities are not likely to be completely compensated for, meaning that standard-of-living equivalence does not occur at each point in time.
To account for this, we follow Greenwood, Hunt, Rickman, and Treyz (1991) in using migration rates to measure the extent to which the system deviates from standard-of-living equivalence.
In our model, the probability of a consumer m i g rating between his present region and any other region depends on moving costs and the sta n d a rd -o fliving differential he perc e i ve s. When he does migra t e, 1 Rosen and Roback do not use their models to estimate the costs of unemployment. They include unemployment rates to control for standard-of-living differences not accounted for by differences in other amenities. 2 See Evans (1990) and Hunt (1993) for discussions.
M A RC H/ AP R I L 2 000 1 S t ra t fo rd Douglas is an associate professor of economics at West Virginia Unive rs i t y. Howa rd J. Wall is a senior economist at the Fe d e ral Re s e r ve Bank of St. Lo u i s. The authors are grateful for the helpful suggestions of Gylfi Zoega, participants in the Labour Market Imperfections Group of the CEPR, and seminar participants at the Fe d e ral Re s e r ve Bank of Cleve l a n d .
it is to the region that would give him the gre a t e s t s ta n d a rd-of-living improvement. Because of mov i n g c o s t s, the sta n d a rd of living differs across regions in the short run, and high levels of unemployment will not be compensated for with higher levels of income. The net cro s s -m i g ration rate between any two regions indicates the degree to which the sta n d a rd of living differs between them, and can be used to estimate the income level that would make the sta n d a rd of living the same across re g i o n s.
Using the above-described model, and data fo r i n t e r p rovincial migration in Canada for 1971-90, we estimate the relationship between net cro s sm i g ration rates (re p resenting differences in sta n d a rd of living) and differences in per-capita incomes, u n e m p l oyment ra t e s, and other amenities. See Le d e n t (1990), Day (1992) , and Milne (1993) for discussions of migration in Canada. We then use this estimated relationship to calculate for each region the re l a t i ve income that would have equated the actual sta n d a rd of living and the sta n d a rd of living without cyc l i c a l u n e m p l oyment. This compensating differential is what we call the cost of cyclical unemployment. In our model, pre f e rences towa rds the tra d e o f f b e t ween unemployment and income are thus revealed by the actual utility-maximizing migra t i o n decisions of consumers.
In principle, any level of unemployment imposes a risk cost, re g a rdless of whether the unemploy m e n t is cyclical or not. Because of this, our model need not be restricted to estimating the costs of cyc l i c a l u n e m p l oyment, but also can be used to calculate the cost of having a level of unemployment above any benchmark ra t e. As we demonstra t e, this can be done by comparing the actual sta n d a rd of living with the sta n d a rd of living that would have occurred had u n e m p l oyment been at the benchmark ra t e.
The question we are addressing is similar to that of Lucas (1987) , I
. m ro h o roglu (1989), Clark, Le s l i e, and Symons (1994), and Dolmas (1998) , who wish to m e a s u re the costs of the business cycle in terms of what people are willing to pay to avoid businesscycle flu c t u a t i o n s. They use calibrated models of a r i s k -ave rse re p re s e n ta t i ve agent to calculate the costs of macroeconomic fluctuations around trend grow t h p a t h s. We l fa re costs arise in these models because the agent gets disutility from fluctuations in his consumption. While our question is similar to this, it is not compatible with theirs because their notion of the business cyc l e, as fluctuations around a trend, is d i f f e rent from our more traditional notion based on cyclical unemployment. Ad d i t i o n a l l y, in our model, individual uncertainty about employment pro s p e c t s exists even in the absence of aggregate uncerta i n t y.
In this paper, Section I presents the model and Section II describes the data, estimation methods, and re g ression re s u l t s. We calculate the reve a l e d costs of cyclical unemployment and the levels of u n e m p l oyment in Section III, and in Section IV we p resent our conclusions.
THE MODEL
Assume that an individual's assessment of the standard of living in a region has two components, one that is commonly held, and another that is individual-specific. Specifically, individual k's assessment of the standard of living he would attain at region i is ( 1 ) w h e re the function v ( . ) is "the" sta n d a rd of living at region i, U i is the unemployment ra t e, Y i is the perc a p i ta income at i, and A i is a ve c tor of amenities, which includes a l l c o n s i d e rations other than income and unemployment. The stochastic term ε i k c a p t u re s the extent to which individual k's assessment of region i d i f f e rs from the common assessment.
If we actually knew the sta n d a rd of living for each region, we could simply estimate the importance of each of the arguments in v ( . ) . With this estimate, we could calculate the cost of any level of unemploy m e n t in terms of lost sta n d a rd of living, or, instead, ex p re s s the cost in terms of the income that would compensate for the level of unemployment. The obvious p roblem with this is that it is impossible to know any re g i o n 's sta n d a rd of living. So, instead, we use the methodology developed by Greenwood, et al. (1991) , who use migration data to estimate re l a t i ve s ta n d a rd of living. Their empirical model is based on their assumption that a region's net migration rate measures the extent to which its standard of living differs from that of the nation: w h e re M i j is the number of people who migrate fro m region i to region j, N i is the population of region i, and v Ϫ is the sta n d a rd of living for the nation as a whole.
The problem with Gre e nwood, et al. 's methodology is that actual potential migrants compare their curre n t region to each of the potential destinations, ra t h e r
than to the national ave ra g e. Thus, it is the c ro s sm i g ration decisions between two regions that prov i d e the appropriate information about pre f e re n c e s, not the net in-migration ra t e. Because of this, we use the ve rsion of the Gre e nwood, et al. method deve l o p e d by Douglas (1997) , Douglas and Wall (2000) , and Wa l l (2000) . In this ve rsion, it is the expected net cro s sm i g ration rate between two regions that is an i n c reasing function of the sta n d a rd-of-living differe ntial. Also, the appropriate cro s s -m i g ration rate ta ke s account of the number of migration o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n potential destination re g i o n s, as proxied for by the destination re g i o n 's population. The sta n d a rd -o fliving differential between two regions there fo re is m e a s u red by a gravity-type net cro s s -m i g ration rate:
( 2 )
For purposes of estimation, specify the sta n d a rdof-living function as ( 3 ) w h e re and a re positive consta n t s. From this, the d i f f e rence in the sta n d a rd of living between the two regions is ( 4 ) Substitute equation 2 into equation 4 and allow fo r m e a s u rement and other error to obta i n ( 5 ) w h e re λ i ϵ ′1nA i , the utility value of amenities.
As mentioned above, the basic methodology of using migration rates to estimate sta n d a rd -o f -l i v i n g d i f f e rentials fo l l ows from Gre e nwood, et al. (1991 ) , Douglas and Wall (2000) , and Wall (2000). Because we wish to separate the effect of labor-market conditions from that of other amenities, we expand the methodology by including the re l a t i ve unemploy m e n t rate as a right-hand-side va r i a b l e. This fo l l ows Ro s e n (1979) and Roback (1982) , who viewed the unemploym e n t rate as a re g i o n -s p e c i fic amenity.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Data and Estimation
The best country to apply our model to is Canada. Not only are the migration and other data of very high quality, but, more importantly for our present purposes, reliable estimates of provincial noncyc l i c a l rates of unemployment are readily ava i l a b l e. Cro s sm i g ration data are from the To tal Migration Series f rom Statistics Canada 1971-90, as calculated fro m census fig u res and Family Allowance accounts. The m i g ration data go back to 1950, but as reported by S tatistics Canada, they are much more reliable after 1 9 70. Real per-capita provincial income is calculated using provincial price indices.
In implementing equation 5, we allow amenity values to change every five ye a rs. It is possible to a l l ow amenities to vary more fre q u e n t l y, but doing so would increase the variability of the estimates. Let Z denote the number of periods over which the amenities are fixed, and P the number of prov i n c e s. There is one observation per-year per unique pair of p rov i n c e s, for a to tal of Z P ( P -1 ) / 2=900 observa t i o n s, each containing the log of real re l a t i ve income ln(Y j /Y i ) , the log of re l a t i ve unemployment ln(U i /U j ), and a set of discrete variables that identify the prov i n c e s. The d i s c rete variables are necessary to estimate re l a t i ve a m e n i t i e s, and consist of one discrete variable fo r each province for each five -year period. Within its c o r responding five -year period, each discrete va r i a b l e has the value of 1 if the province is province i, -1 if the province is province j, and ze ro otherwise. We avoid singularity by imposing the restriction that the λs sum to ze ro for each five -year period, meaning that the amenity estimates are re l a t i ve to ze ro .
The re g ression results are summarized by Ta b l e 1. The coefficients on real income and unemp l oyment are positive and statistically different fro m ze ro. Note that ^Ͼ ^( i . e., the sta n d a rd of living is m o re re s p o n s i ve to a change in re l a t i ve income than to a change in re l a t i ve unemploy m e n t ) .
Estimated Amenities
Although our primary focus here is to estimate the costs of unemployment, our model can be used to calculate the re l a t i ve values of other amenities
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS a c ross prov i n c e s. Refer to Ta b le1 and note that λ Ͼ 0 indicates that the utility value of amenities (exc l u s i ve of the unemployment rate) was higher than the national ave ra g e, and vice ve rsa. The provinces are listed in order of the value of their amenities. See Douglas and Wall (2000) for the use of these re s u l t s to rank the provinces by to tal sta n d a rd of living.
THE REVEALED COST OF UNEMPLOYMENT
Cyclical Unemployment
In this section, we calculate the amount of income that people would be willing to give up in return fo r h aving no cyclical unemployment. Define the noncyclical sta n d a rd-of-living in province j as the sta n d a rd of living that would prevail if the unemployment ra t e is at the noncyclical rate U′ j , and if per-capita income we re Y j . The noncyclical sta n d a rd of living is then ( 6 ) Substituting the estimated para m e t e rs ^a nd ^, the re l a t i ve income that would be re q u i red to equate the n o n cyclical sta n d a rd of living and the actual s ta n d a rd of living, RY * j ϵ Y ′ j /Y j , can be obtained fro m :
If a province's actual unemployment rate is g reater than the noncyclical ra t e, then RY * j is less than o n e. The rate at which Y ′ j is less than actual income is the amount of income that people would be willing to give up to have no cyclical unemploy m e n t , which is what we call the cost of cyclical unemploym e n t . Thus, the cost of cyclical unemployment is L jt ϵ1ϪRY * jt for province j in year t. Aggregation of these costs across provinces and over time is straightforward, and is described in the appendix. The next step is to find appropriate measures of U ′ j to substitute into equation 7. We use two possible measures to give us the lower and upper bounds of the costs of cyclical unemployment.
Lower limit of the costs of cyclical unemploy m e n t . In this subsection we calculate the costs of cyc l i c a l u n e m p l oyment using estimates of prov i n c i a l n o n cyclical unemployment rates for each year fro m 1 9 71-86, ta ken from Burns (1991) and reported in Table 2 . As described by Burns, his estimates of the n o n cyclical rates are based on what would be ex p e c t e d in the steady sta t e. The Canadian unemploy m e n t experience over this period is summarized by Figure 1 . The estimated national steady-state unemploy m e n t in Canada ranged between 6 and 7 percent during the 1970 s, and rose to around 8 percent during the early 1980s. For all ye a rs but 1973 and 1974, cyc l i c a l u n e m p l oyment was positive at the national leve l . The provincial noncyclical ra t e s, re p roduced in Ta b l e 3, varied greatly across Canada during this period. Table 3 presents the cost of cyclical unemployment as a perc e n tage of provincial income for each p rovince for each year (L j t ). The bottom row is each p rov i n c e 's cost as a percent of income over the e n t i re time period (L j ), and the last column is the aggregate cost for Canada for each year (L t ) . The bottom right-hand corner is the to tal cost of cyclical unemployment for Canada for the period 1 9 71-86 (L) .
C yclical unemployment was most costly fo r O n tario, 4.7 percent of provincial income over the period. The provinces with the lowest costs of cyclical unemployment we re New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Saska tc h ewan; 0.7 to 1.1 p e rcent of provincial income. This was achieved in S a s ka tc h ewan with low steady-state unemploy m e n t and low actual unemployment, whereas the other t h ree had high levels of both, but with little d i f f e rence between them. For the remaining five p rovinces the cost of cyclical unemployment wa s b e t ween 2.2 and 3.2 percent of provincial income.
For Canada as a whole, yearly costs of cyc l i c a l u n e m p l oyment we re low during the early 1970 s, rose to a peak of 7.9 percent of national income in 1983, and fell to 4.2 percent by 1986. For the entire Table 2 Figure 1 period of 1971-86, the costs of cyclical unemploy m e n t we re 3.3 percent of national income.
Upper limit of the costs of cyclical unemploy m e n t.
T h e re is a potential problem with using estimates of the noncyclical unemployment that are based on what should occur in the steady sta t e, as we have done above. When there is unemployment hys t e re s i s, an increase in cyclical unemployment can cause the steady-state level of unemployment to rise. 3 I f c u r rent cyclical unemployment increases future s t e a d y -s tate ra t e s, then the use of steady-sta t e u n e m p l oyment rates suppresses the effect that past u n e m p l oyment has on current risk. Because of t h i s, we must eliminate the possible effects that the actual unemployment rates may have had on steadys tate ra t e s.
In order to obtain an upper limit on the costs of unemployment over the period, we assume that all changes in the steady-state rates estimated by Burns (1991) are attributed to hysteresis. Thus, to eliminate the effect that the unemployment history may have had on the steady-state unemployment rates, we use the estimates of the steady-state rates for 1971 as the noncyclical unemployment rate for the entire period. These estimates of the costs of cyclical unemployment are presented in Table 4 .
Note that the sums of the upper limits of costs of cyclical unemployment are for 1971-86 only, so that t h ey are comparable to the lower limits calculated a b ove. The difference between the upper and lowe r limits are greatest for the Maritime Prov i n c e s, where the increases in the steady-state unemployment ra t e s we re quite larg e. Only for Alberta, Manitoba, and O n tario are the upper limits not more than twice the l ower limits. For Canada as a whole, when all changes in the steady-state unemployment rates are attributed to the unemployment histo r y, the costs of cyclical unemployment between 1971 and 1986 wa s 7.4 percent of national income. S u m m a r y. Another way of interpreting the costs of cyclical unemployment is to call them the benefit s that would accrue from policies that eliminated cyc l ical unemployment. If these policies also have the effect of slowing down growth, it is useful to know the grow t h -u n e m p l oyment tradeoff to see if the policies would have been wo r t h w h i l e. For Canada b e t ween 1971 and 1986, in which real growth ave r-L ower Limits of the Costs of Cyclical Unemployment, as a Pe rc e n t age of Income N o n cyclical unemployment rates = steady-state rates from Burns (1991) Alb.
B Table 3 3 See Lindbeck and Snower (1986) and Laya rd, Nickell, and Jackman (1991 ) . aged 3.6 percent a ye a r, a growth rate that was 0.4-0.8 percent higher in each year would have genera ted enough income to compensate for the 3.3-7.4 p e rcent costs of cyclical unemployment. In other wo rd s, the social benefit of eliminating cyclical flu ctuations of unemployment during this period wo u l d h ave been the same as the social benefit of having a g rowth rate that was 0.4-0.8 percent higher in each ye a r. Real growth in Canada ave raged 4.6 percent a year from 1950 to 1970. If growth from 1971 to 1986 had kept up with this ra t e, even the upper limit of the costs of cyclical unemployment would have been compensated fo r. A ny complete discussion of our results must keep in mind that the results are very sensitive to the time period examined. We selected our time period because the migration data are much more re l i a b l e after 1970, and because the most recent estimates we have of the natural rate for all the provinces are f rom 1986. Adding ye a rs to the beginning or the end of our period would lower the estimated to tal costs, and also lower the additional growth that would have compensated for the costs. For insta n c e, simply by including 1987-90 in calculating the upper limit of the costs of cyclical unemployment, the compens a tory growth per year falls to 0.6 percent. In addition, because the ye a rs 1971-86 have been the most economically turbulent ye a rs in post-war Canada, our estimates of the costs of cyclical unemploy m e n t over the period are higher than for other periods. We should also keep in mind that policy m a ke rs may h ave already learned lessons from the period, and that the likelihood of a repetition of the re fla t i o n / d e flation cycle of the late 1970s and early 1980s may be low. Howeve r, with policymaking being what it is, we should not count on this being true.
U n e m p l oyment Leve l s
Another way of looking at the costs of unemp l oyment is that there is some benchmark level of u n e m p l oyment that is viewed subjectively as desirable or optimal. An unemployment rate above this benchmark level is socially suboptimal and there fo re Table 4 imposes costs on society. Thus, the cost of unemp l oyment can be viewed as the cost of it being above some acceptable benchmark level. The method described above can be adapted easily to include these other costs of unemployment. Note that our calculations are not net of the costs of achieving the benchmark ra t e s. Substitute any benchmark unemployment rate for U′ j in equation 7, and the interpretation of L it becomes the percent of provincial income that people would be willing to pay to have the benchmark unemployment rate. In other words, it is the cost of having unemployment above the benchmark rate. Compared to the calculation of the costs of cyclical unemployment, the only difference here is that if a province's actual unemployment is lower than the benchmark rate, then the cost of unemployment is zero.
The selection of a benchmark unemploy m e n t rate is completely subjective. There are many d i f f e rent views about what the "desira b l e," "optimal," or "minimally acceptable" level of unemployment is.
Without apologies, the arbitrary unemploy m e n t benchmark that we chose for each province for each year is 6 percent. The costs of unemployment above this benchmark are presented in Table 5 . Although it is perfectly reasonable to believe that the desira b l e u n e m p l oyment rate is different for provinces and a c ross time, we leave this calculation to the re a d e r. Note that in Table 5 , the to tal costs over time are calculated for the ye a rs 1971-86, so that they are c o m p a rable to the to tal costs calculated in Tables 3  and 4. As indicated by Table 5 , the costs of hav i n g u n e m p l oyment above 6 percent during 1971 -8 6 varied widely across prov i n c e s. For British Columbia, N ew Brunswick, New foundland, Nova Scotia, Prince E d wa rd Island, and Quebec, the costs we re above 10 p e rcent of provincial income. Saska tc h ewan and M a n i toba, on the other hand, had costs of only 1.8 and 3.0 percent, re s p e c t i ve l y. For Canada as a whole, the cost of having unemployment above 6 perc e n t was lowest during 1973-74, peaked at 14 perc e n t during 1983, and was 7.5 percent of national income Table 5 over the period. Additional growth of 0.6 percent a year would have compensated for these costs.
C ON C LU S I ON S
The problem with existing methods of measuring the costs of unemployment is that they are not particularly useful for normative policy analys i s. Their focus is on the output that is fo regone when there is unemployment, instead of on the utility losses that result from unemployment. In contrast, we p ropose an approach that yields estimates of the utility costs of unemployment as measured by the amount that people would be willing to pay to avo i d the risk of unemployment. Under the assumptions of our model, the difference in the sta n d a rd of living b e t ween two regions is equal to the difference in the rates of cross migration. We then estimate the ex t e n t to which income, unemployment, and other amenities contribute to differences in the sta n d a rd of living. Using these estimates, we calculate the amount o f income that people would be willing to pay in ord e r to avoid the possibility of unemployment. We estimate the cost of cyclical unemployment in Canada fro m 1 9 71 to 1986 to have been between 3.3 and 7.4 percent of national income over the period. Ad d i t i o n a l g rowth of 0.4 to 0.8 percent per year would have g e n e rated enough income to have compensated fo r these costs.
As a perc e n tage of national income, the to tal cost of cyclical unemployment in year t over the P provinces of Canada is w h e re N j t is province j's population in year t. For combining costs over time, we simply use the s h a re of all income generated over the entire period that would have compensated for the costs of cyclical unemployment. So, the cost of cyc l i c a l u n e m p l oyment for province j over any T ye a rs is F i n a l l y, the to tal costs of cyclical unemploy m e n t in Canada over the entire time period is obtained by summing the numera tor and denominator of the a b ove ex p ression across prov i n c e s :
